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MEASURING THE COST AND SOME PERFORMANCE INDICATORS OF PAID-EXTENSION
The Case of Agricultural Technology Transfer in Nicaragua Abstract I I In n n t t th h hi i is s s p p pa a ap p pe e er r r w w we e e a a ad d dd d dr r re e es s ss s s t t th h he e e c c co o on n nc c ce e ep p pt t t o o of f f p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n t t th h ha a at t t i i is s s e e em m me e er r rg g gi i in n ng g g i i in n n m m ma a an n ny y y d d de e ev v ve e el l lo o op p pi i in n ng g g a a an n nd d d d d de e ev v ve e el l lo o op p pe e ed d d c c co o ou u un n nt t tr r ri i ie e es s s. . . W W We e e s s su u ug g gg g ge e es s st t t a a a s s se e et t t o o of f f e e ec c co o on n no o om m mi i ic c c a a an n na a al l ly y ys s se e es s s t t th h ha a at t t c c co o ou u ul l ld d d b b be e e u u us s se e ed d d e e ei i it t th h he e er r r t t to o og g ge e et t th h he e er r r o o or r r s s se e ep p pa a ar r ra a at t te e el l ly y y t t to o o m m me e ea a as s su u ur r re e e t t th h he e e c c co o os s st t t a a an n nd d d p p pe e er r rf f fo o or r rm m ma a an n nc c ce e e o o of f f p p pr r ro o ov v vi i id d di i in n ng g g e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n s s se e er r rv v vi i ic c ce e es s s. . . W W We e e d d de e em m mo o on n ns s st t tr r ra a at t te e e t t th h he e e a a ap p pp p pl l li i ic c ca a at t ti i io o on n n o o of f f s s so o om m me e e o o of f f t t th h he e e a a an n na a al l ly y ys s se e es s s, , , u u us s si i in n ng g g t t th h he e e c c ca a as s se e e o o of f f N N Ni i ic c ca a ar r ra a ag g gu u ua a a ( ( (a a al l lt t th h ho o ou u ug g gh h h t t th h he e er r re e e i i is s s n n no o o a a at t tt t te e em m mp p pt t t t t to o o e e es s st t ti i im m ma a at t te e e i i im m mp p pa a ac c ct t t o o of f f p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n i i in n n N N Ni i ic c ca a ar r rg g gu u ua a a) ) ), , , w w wh h he e er r re e e p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n h h ha a as s s b b be e ee e en n n p p pr r ra a ac c ct t ti i ic c ce e ed d d f f fo o or r r s s se e ev v ve e er r ra a al l l y y ye e ea a ar r rs s s. . . R R Re e es s su u ul l lt t ts s s s s su u ug g gg g ge e es s st t t t t th h ha a at t t p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n i i is s s f f fe e ea a as s si i ib b bl l le e e, , , a a an n nd d d h h ha a as s s a a a p p po o os s si i it t ti i iv v ve e e i i im m mp p pa a ac c ct t t e e ev v ve e en n n i i in n n a a a r r re e el l la a at t ti i iv v ve e el l ly y y p p po o oo o or r r c c co o ou u un n nt t tr r ry y y s s su u uc c ch h h a a as s s N N Ni i ic c ca a ar r ra a ag g gu u ua a a. . . T T Th h he e e r r re e el l la a at t ti i iv v ve e el l ly y y h h hi i ig g gh h h c c co o os s st t t r r re e ec c co o ov v ve e er r ry y y r r ra a at t te e es s s, , , a a ac c cc c co o om m mp p pl l li i is s sh h he e ed d d s s so o o f f fa a ar r r, , , a a an n nd d d t t th h he e e e e ec c co o on n no o om m mi i ic c c p p pe e er r rf f fo o or r rm m ma a an n nc c ce e es s s o o of f f t t th h he e e t t tw w wo o o p p pr r ro o og g gr r ra a am m ms s s d d de e em m mo o on n ns s st t tr r ra a at t te e e t t th h ha a at t t e e ev v ve e en n n p p po o oo o or r r f f fa a ar r rm m me e er r rs s s a a ar r re e e w w wi i il l ll l li i in n ng g g t t to o o p p pa a ay y y f f fo o or r r a a a s s se e er r rv v vi i ic c ce e e t t th h ha a at t t c c co o on n nt t tr r ri i ib b bu u ut t te e es s s t t to o o i i in n nc c cr r re e ea a as s si i in n ng g g t t th h he e ei i ir r r e e ec c co o on n no o om m mi i ic c c e e ef f ff f fi i ic c ci i ie e en n nc c cy y y a a an n nd d d e e en n n---
Introduction
Public Agricultural Extension (Extension), like many other public services, is at cross roads. Extension was also criticized for inefficiency and in some cases for irrelevancy (Rivera 1996a).
Lately, public budgets for extension activities in many countries were drastically cut and the scope of the extension work was reduced or modified. Structural changes in extension provision and financing alternatives have been one type of response to the changes in the environment in which extension in now operating throughout the world. Terms such as private extension, paidextension, commercialized extension, and co-financed extension, are used to express the emergence of a service that is provided, either by public agencies or by private companies, for a fee.
We will use here the term "paid-extension" to describe these versions.
T T Th h he e er r re e e a a ar r re e e s s se e ev v ve e er r ra a al l l e e ex x xp p pe e er r ri i ie e en n nc c ce e es s s o o of f f p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n e e ex x xp p pe e er r ri i ie e en n nc c ce e es s s a a ar r ro o ou u un n nd d d t t th h he e e w w wo o or r rl l ld d d, , , w w wh h hi i ic c ch h h a a ar r re e e r r re e ep p po o or r rt t te e ed d d i i in n n t t th h he e e l l li i it t te e er r ra a at t tu u ur r re e e. .
. T T Th h he e ey y y d d di i if f ff f fe e er r r a a an n nd d d e e ea a ac c ch h h c c ca a as s se e e c c co o or r rr r re e es s sp p po o on n nd d ds s s t t to o o t t th h he e e l l lo o oc c ca a al l l p
p ph h hy y ys s si i ic c ca a al l l, , , e e ec c co o on n no o om m mi i ic c c a a an n nd d d i i in n ns s st t ti i it t tu u ut t ti i io o on n na a al l l c c co o on n nd d di i it t ti i io o on n ns s s u u un n nd d de e er r r w w wh h hi i ic c ch h h t t th h he e e a a ag g gr r ri i ic c cu u ul l lt t tu u ur r re e e s s se e ec c ct t to o or r r o o op p pe e er r ra a at t te e es s s. . . T T Th h he e ey y y a a ar r re e e a a al l ls s so o o d d de e es s si i ig g gn n ne e ed d d t t to o o m m me e ee e et t t t t th h he e e c c ca a ap p pa a ac c ci i it t ty y y o o of f f t t th h he e e f f fa a ar r rm m me e er r rs s s ( ( (p p pr r ro o od d du u uc c ce e er r rs s s) ) ) t t to o o c c co o o---f f fi i in n na a an n nc c ce e e t t th h he e e c c co o os s st t ts s s o o of f f t t th h he e e s s se e er r rv v vi i ic c ce e e. . . P P Pa a ay y ym m me e en n nt t t b b by y y p p pr r ro o od d du u uc c ce e er r rs s s f f fo o or r r e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n s s se e er r rv v vi i ic c ce e es s s h h ha a av v ve e e b b be e ee e en n n i i im m mp p pl l le e em m me e en n nt t te e ed d d i i in n n v v va a ar r ry y yi i in n ng g g d d de e eg g gr r re e ee e es s s i i in n n a a a n n nu u um m Arrangements for paid extension, as they are reported in the literature, include (see Keynan et al., 1997) : (a) direct contracts between governments or municipalities and private consultants to provide extension for a limited period (Nicaragua). This mode also includes payment rates that depend on producers' income level (Chile, Mexico, Colombia); (b) direct agreements between producers and extensionists where payment is calculated in terms of crop or profit share (Ecuador); (c) tradable extension vouchers that are funded and awarded to low income producers by government, based on certain criteria, and are redeemed by the extensionists upon provision of the service (Costa Rica); (d) direct contracts between groups of producers and extensionists and other experts (Argentina, China); (e) a combination of funding via direct payment by producers, contribution by agricultural organizations, and direct and indirect taxes (France); (f) charge on a 2 2 time-cost basis for certain services (United Kingdom); and (g) negotiated lump-sum per an agreed project-based activity by the extensionist (Queensland, Australia).
Most of the existing studies provide information on the structure and operation of the different paid-extension arrangements, and, in some cases also some anecdotal results on the costs and benefits associated with these operations. However, there is not enough evidence and analysis that can help the reader in reaching a conclusion on the degree of success of certain paid extension arrangements.
T T Th h he e e l l li i it t te e er r ra a at t tu u ur r re e e i i in n nc c cl l lu u ud d de e es s s s s se e ev v ve e er r ra a al l l s s st t tu u ud d di i ie e es s s t t th h ha a at t t a a ad d dd d dr r re e es s ss s s t t th h he e e e e ec c co o on n no o om m mi i ic c c a a as s sp p pe e ec c ct t ts s s o o of f f p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n. . . H H Ho o on n ne e e ( ( (1 1 19 9 99 9 91 1 1) ) ), , , i i in n n a a a t t th h he e eo o or r re e et t ti i ic c ca a al l l a a an n na a al l ly y ys s si i is s s a a at t tt t te e em m mp p pt t ts s s t t to o o e e es s st t ti i im m ma a at t te e e t t th h he e e i i im m mp p pl l li i ic c ca a at t ti i io o on n ns s s o o of f f r r re e ec c ce e en n nt t t u u us s se e e o o of f f d d di i ir r re e ec c ct t t c c ch h ha a ar r rg g ge e es s s t t to o o f f fi i in n na a an n nc c ce e e v v va a ar r ri i io o ou u us s s r r ru u ur r ra a al l l e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n n n ne e et t tw w wo o or r rk k ks s s i i in n n A A Au u us s st t tr r ra a al l li i ia a a. . . D D Di i in n na a ar r r ( ( (1 1 19 9 99 9 96 6 6) ) ) a a ap p pp p pl l li i ie e es s s a a an n n a a ap p p---p p pr r ro o oa a ac c ch h h t t th h ha a at t t d d de e et t te e er r rm m mi i in n ne e es s s h h ho o ow w w m m mu u uc c ch h h t t to o o c c ch h ha a ar r rg g ge e e f f fo o or r r e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n s s se e er r rv v vi i ic c ce e es s s, , , u u us s si i in n ng g g a a an n n i i il l ll l lu u us s st t tr r ra a at t ti i iv v ve e e e e ex x xa a am m mp p pl l le e e f f fr r ro o om m m I I Is s sr r ra a ae e el l l. . . S S Sc c ch h hw w wa a ar r rt t tz z z ( ( (1 1 19 9 99 9 94 4 4) ) ) r r re e ev v vi i ie e ew w ws s s s s se e ev v ve e er r ra a al l l c c co o on n nc c ce e ep p pt t ts s s ( ( (a a am m me e en n nd d de e ed d d b b by y y c c ca a as s se e e s s st t tu u ud d dy y y a a an n na a al l ly y ys s si i is s s) ) ), , , s s su u uc c ch h h a a as s s p p pu u ub b bl l li i ic c c v v vs s s. . . p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e g g go o oo o od d ds s s, , , i i in n nf f fo o or r rm m ma a at t ti i io o on n n t t tr r ra a an n ns s sf f fe e er r r, , , a a an n nd d d e e ex x xt t te e er r rn n na a al l li i it t ti i ie e es s s, , , w w wh h hi i ic c ch h h a a ar r re e e a a as s ss s so o oc c ci i ia a at t te e ed d d w w wi i it t th h h p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n. . . H H Ho o ow w we e ev v ve e er r r, , , s s se e ev v ve e er r ra a al l lu u ue e es s st t ti i io o on n ns s s s s st t ti i il l ll l l r r re e em m ma a ai i in n n t t to o o b b be e e a a an n ns s sw w we e er r re e ed d d. . . F F Fo o or r r e e ex x xa a am m mp p pl l le e e, , , c c ca a an n n o o on n ne e e a a ar r rr r ra a an n ng g ge e e---m m me e en n nt t t f f fo o or r r p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n t t th h ha a at t t w w wa a as s s s s su u uc c cc c ce e es s ss s sf f fu u ul l ll l ly y y e e ex x xp p pe e er r ri i ie e en n nc c ce e ed d d i i in n n o o on n ne e e c c co o ou u un n nt t tr r ry y y b b be e e d d du u up p pl l li i ic c ca a at t te e ed d d i i in n n a a an n no o ot t th h he e er r r c c co o ou u un n nt t tr r ry y y? ? ? H H Ho o ow w w d d do o oe e es s s o o on n ne e e s s se e el l le e ec c ct t t t t th h he e e a a ap p pp p pr r ro o op p pr r ri i ia a at t te e e p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n a a ar r rr r ra a an n ng g ge e em m me e en n nt t t f f fo o or r r a a a g g gi i iv v ve e en n n s s se e et t t o o of f f c c co o on n n---d d di i it t ti i io o on n ns s s? ? ? T T Th h he e es s se e eu u ue e es s st t ti i io o on n ns s s s s su u ug g gg g ge e es s st t t t t th h ha a at t t a a a m m me e et t th h ho o od d do o ol l lo o og g gy y y t t to o o c c co o om m mp p pa a ar r re e e b b be e et t tw w we e ee e en n n d d di i if f ff f fe e er r re e en n nt t t p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n a a ar r rr r ra a an n ng g ge e em m me e en n nt t ts s s, , , i i is s s d d de e es s si i ir r ra a ab b bl l le e e. . .
This paper develops a framework for comparing the cost and several performance indicators of various paid-extension programs by using actual data from two types of paid-extension programs in Nicaragua, and assessing their performance. 2 2 2 The analysis focuses on selected performance indicators and their application using available data from the experience in Nicaragua.
The next section develops a framework for comparison between the two types of paid-extension. The debate on public vs. private extension continues to rage among experts in the field. The debate includes issues such as should extension be publicly funded? Who should pay and how much should be paid for extension services, and which segments in the farming population can afford to pay for extension? (See Cary, 1993; Schwartz, 1994; and Rivera, 1996a,b) . Although significant, this debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
2 2 2 The purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the paid-extension performance in Nicaragua but rather to illustrate, using available data from Nicaragua, the application of the indicators developed in the paper. 3 3
Then in the third section the two systems of paid-extension in Nicaragua are described. Section four applies the analytical framework to available data from two private extension programs in Nicaragua. The paper is concluded with suggestions for policy and directions of future research.
A Conceptual Framework for Comparing Paid-Extension Performance
I I In n n e e ev v va a al l lu u ua a at t ti i in n ng g g t t th h he e e p p pe e er r rf f fo o or r rm m ma a an n nc c ce e e o o of f f p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n, , , t t tw w wo o o c c co o om m mp p pa a ar r ri i is s so o on n ns s s h h ha a av v ve e e t t to o o b b be e e a a ad d dd d dr r re e es s ss s se e ed d d. . . F F Fi i ir r rs s st t t, , , a a a c c co o om m mp p pa a ar r ri i is s so o on n n b b be e et t tw w we e ee e en n n p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n a a an n nd d d p p pu u ub b bl l li i ic c c e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n p p pe e er r rf f fo o or r rm m ma a an n nc c ce e es s s a a an n nd d d s s se e ec c co o on n nd d d, , , a a a c c co o om m mp p pa a ar r ri i is s so o on n n a a am m mo o on n ng g g a a al l lt t te e er r rn n na a at t ti i iv v ve e e p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n p p pr r ro o og g gr r ra a am m ms s s. . . A A Al l lt t th h ho o ou u ug g gh h h t t th h he e e a a an n na a al l ly y ys s si i is s s s s sh h ho o ou u ul l ld d d n n no o ot t t b b be e e d d de e et t ta a ac c ch h he e ed d d f f fr r ro o om m m t t th h he e e o o ob b bj j je e ec c ct t ti i iv v ve e es s s f f fo o or r r w w wh h hi i ic c ch h h p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n w w wa a as s s i i in n ni i it t ti i ia a at t te e ed d d o o on n n t t th h he e e f f fi i ir r rs s st t t p p pl l la a ac c ce e e, , , t t th h he e er r re e e a a ar r re e e s s se e ev v ve e er r ra a al l b by y y e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n ni i is s st t ts s s, , , f f fa a ar r rm m me e er r rs s s' ' ' p p pa a ar r rt t ti i ic c ci i ip p pa a at t ti i io o on n n i i in n n e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n a a ac c ct t ti i iv v vi i it t ti i ie e es s s, , , c c ch h ha a an n ng g ge e es s s i i in n n a a ag g g---r r ri i ic c cu u ul l lt t tu u ur r ra a al l l p p pr r ra a ac c ct t ti i ic c ce e es s s d d du u ue e e t t to o o t t th h he e e p p pr r ro o ov v vi i is s si i io o on n n o o of f f e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n, , , i i im m mp p pr r ro o ov v ve e ed d d f f fa a ar r rm m m---l l le e ev v ve e el l l p p ph h hy y ys s si i ic c ca a al l l p p pe e er r rf f fo o or r rm m ma a an n nc c ce e e ( ( (y y yi i ie e el l ld d ds s s, , , c c cr r ro o op p p v v va a ar r ri i ie e et t ti i ie e es s s, , , i i in n np p pu u ut t ts s s) ) ), , , a a an n nd d d i i in n nc c cr r re e ea a as s se e ed d d f f fa a ar r rm m m---l l le e ev v ve e el l l p p pr r ro o of f fi i it t ta a ab b bi i il l li i it t ty y y. . . I I In n n t t th h he e e c c ca a as s se e e o o of f f p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e e e ex x xt t te e en n n---s s si i io o on n n, , , t t th h he e er r re e e i i is s s a a al l ls s so o o a a a n n ne e ee e ed d d t t to o o c c co o om m mp p pa a ar r re e e b b be e et t tw w we e ee e en n n p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e a a an n nd d d p p pu u ub b bl l li i ic c c e e ex x xp p pe e en n nd d di i it t tu u ur r re e es s s o o on n n e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n. . . W W We e e d d di i is s st t ti i in n ng g gu u ui i is s sh h h a a am m mo o on n ng g g f f fo o ou u ur r r c c ca a at t te e eg g go o or r ri i ie e es s s o o of f f a a an n na a al l ly y ys s si i is s s: : : i i in n nd d di i iv v vi i id d du u ua a al l l p p pr r ro o od d du u uc c ce e er r r l l le e ev v ve e el l l a a an n na a al l ly y ys s si i is s s, , , a a ag g ge e en n nc c cy y y---l l le e ev v ve e el l l a a an n na a al l ly y ys s si i is s s, , , g g go o ov v ve e er r rn n nm m me e en n nt t t---l l le e ev v ve e el l l a a an n na a al l ly y ys s si i is s s, , , a a an n nd d d s s so o oc c ci i ia a al l l---l l le e ev v ve e el l l a a an n na a al l ly y ys s si i is s s. . . I I In n n t t th h he e e f f fo o ol l ll l lo o ow w wi i in n ng g g s s se e ec c ct t ti i io o on n ns s s w w we e e p p pr r ro o ov v vi i id d de e e a a a d d de e et t ta a ai i il l le e ed d d a a an n na a al l ly y yt t ti i ic c ca a al l l f f fr r ra a am m me e ew w wo o or r rk k k f f fo o or r r e e ea a ac c ch h h c c ca a at t te e eg g go o or r ry y y, , , w w wh h hi i ic c ch h h i i in n n t t tu u ur r rn n n i i is s s t t th h he e e b b ba a as s si i is s s f f fo o or r r m m me e ea a as s su u ur r ri i in n ng g g t t th h he e e c c co o os s st t t a a an n nd d d s s so o om m me e e p p pe e er r rf f fo o or r rm m ma a an n nc c ce e e i i in n nd d di i ic c ca a at t to o or r rs s s o o of f f p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n i i in n n N N Ni i ic c ca a ar r ra a ag g gu u ua a a. . .
Individual producers
The impact of paid-extension on individual producers can be estimated in several ways, compared to performance at the no-extension or at the public extension stage. First, by improving technical efficiency, where increase in profit at any given combination of other inputs X 1 and X 2 is observed ( Figure 1) . Second, by improving allocative efficiency, where at a given technical efficiency extension increases profits due to a better economic allocation of scarce inputs X 1 and X 2 (see Figure 2). 4 4
In Figure 1 the extension impact is measured by the ability to move from production isoquant Y 0 to production isoquant Y 1 (Y 1 >Y 0 ). In this model the difference between Y 1 and Y 0 may be due to increased yield, or increased revenue (resulting from improved yield quality). In the case of paid-extension, distinction has to be made between the agency/companylevel analysis and the government-level analysis, where the objectives can differ widely. 
. T T Th h hi i is s s i i is s s t t th h he e e c
c ca a as s se e e w w wh h he e en n n t t th h he e e c c co o om m mp p pa a an n ny y y i i is s s p p pr r ro o ov v vi i id d de e ed d d b b by y y t t th h he e e g g go o ov v ve e er r rn n nm m me e en n nt t t w w wi i it t th h h a a a f f fi i ix x xe e ed d d a a al l ll l lo o ow w wa a an n nc c ce e e p p pe e er r r p p pr r ro o od d du u uc c ce e er r r. . . G G Go o ov v ve e er r rn n nm m me e en n nt t ts s s m m ma a ay y y r r re e eg g gu u ul l la a at t te e e p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n t t to o o e e en n ns s su u ur r re e e c c ce e er r r---t t ta a ai i in n n s s se e er r rv v vi i ic c ce e e p p pr r ro o ov v vi i is s si i io o on n n s s st t ta a an n nd d da a ar r rd d ds s s. . . F F Fo o or r r e e ex x xa a am m mp p pl l le e e, , , g g go o ov v ve e er r rn n nm m me e en n nt t ts s s c c co o ou u ul l ld d d i i in n ns s si i is s st t t t t th h ha a at t t p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e c c co o om m mp p pa a an n ni i ie e es s s , t t th h he e er r re e ef f fo o or r re e e, , , t t ta a ak k ke e e i i in n nt t to o o a a ac c cc c co o ou u un n nt t t t t th h he e e p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e a a as s s w w we e el l ll l l a a as s s t t th h he e e s s so o oc c ci i ia a al l l c c co o os s st t ts s s a a an n nd d d b b be e en n ne e ef f fi i it t ts s s a a as s ss s so o oc c ci i ia a at t te e ed d d w w wi i it t th h h t t th h he e e p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t ti i iz z za a at t ti i io o on n n o o of f f t t th h he e e s s se e er r rv v vi i ic c ce e e. . . A A A s s si i im m mp p pl l le e e a a ap p p---p p pr r ro o oa a ac c ch h h w w wo o ou u ul l ld d d c c ca a al l lc c cu u ul l la a at t te e e p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e---l l le e ev v ve e el l l c c co o os s st t t---b b be e en n ne e ef f fi i it t t r r ra a at t ti i io o os s s o o of f f p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n, , , a a an n nd d d t t th h he e en n n e e es s st t ti i im m ma a at t te e e t t th h he e e a a ad d dd d di i it t ti i io o on n na a al l l, , , i i if f f a a an n ny y y, , , s s so o oc c ci i ia a al l l c c co o os s st t t a a as s ss s so o oc c ci i ia a at t te e ed d d w w wi i it t th h h p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n. . . F F Fo o or r r e e ex x xa a am m mp p pl l le e e, , , s s so o oc c ci i ia a al l l c c co o os s st t t m m ma a ay y y i i in n n---c c cl l lu u ud d de e e t t th h he e e g g go o ov v ve e er r rn n nm m me e en n nt t t p p pa a ay y ym m me e en n nt t t t t to o o p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e c c co o om m mp p pa a an n ni i ie e es s s ( ( (i i in n n a a ad d dd d di i it t ti i io o on n n t t to o o t t th h he e e f f fa a ar r rm m me e er r r p p pa a ay y ym m me e en n nt t ts s s) ) ). . . S S So o oc c ci i ia a al l l c c co o os s st t t m m ma a ay y y a a al l ls s so o o i i in n nc c cl l lu u ud d de e e t t th h he e e o o op p pp p po o or r rt t tu u un n ni i it t ty y y c c co o os s st t t a a as s ss s so o oc c ci i ia a at t te e ed d d w w wi i it t th h h t t th h he e e c c ch h ha a an n ng g ge e e i i in n n c c cl l li i ie e en n nt t te e el l le e e a a as s s p p pa a ai i id d d---e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n t t ta a ak k ke e es s s p p pl l la a ac c ce e e. . . A A As s s w w wa a as s s s s su u ug g gg g ge e es s st t te e ed d d i i in n n D D Di i in n na a ar r r ( ( (1 1 19 9 99 9 96 6 6) ) ), , , a a an n nd d d w w wa a as s s a a al l ls s so o o o o ob b bs s se e er r rv v ve e ed d d i i in n n t t th h he e e c c ca a as s se e e o o of f f p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t ti i iz z za a at t ti i io o on n n i i in n n t t th h he e e U U Un n ni i it t te e ed d d K K Ki i in n ng g gd d do o om m m ( ( (D D Da a an n nc c ce e ey y y, , , 1 1 19 9 99 9 93 3 3) ) ), , , t t tr r ra a ad d di i it t ti i io o on n na a al l l c c cl l li i ie e en n nt t te e el l le e e o o of f f p p pu u ub b bl l li i ic c c e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n d d do o o n n no o ot t t g g ge e et t t t t th h he e e s s sa a am m me e e e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n o o or r r a a an n ny y y e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n s s se e er r rv v vi i ic c ce e es s s w w wh h he e en n n p p pu u ub b bl l li i ic c c e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n i i is s s p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t ti i iz z ze e ed d d. . . T T Th h he e e s s so o o---7 7 c c ci i ia a al l l o o ob b bj j je e ec c ct t ti i iv v ve e e w w wo o ou u ul l ld d d b b be e e t t to o o m m mi i in n ni i im m mi i iz z ze e e t t th h he e e d d di i if f ff f fe e er r re e en n nc c ce e es s s b b be e et t tw w we e ee e en n n p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e a a an n nd d d s s so o oc c ci i ia a al l l B B B/ / /C C C r r ra a at t ti i io o os s s. . . I I It t t i i is s s u u un n nd d de e er r rs s st t ta a an n nd d da a ab b bl l le e e t t th h ha a at t t i i in n n t t th h he e e c c ca a as s se e e o o of f f e e ex x xt t te e en n ns s si i io o on n n, , , p p pr r ri i iv v va a at t te e e b b be e en n ne e ef f fi i it t t---c c co o os s st t t r r ra a at t ti i io o o i i is s s d d di i if f ff f fe e er r re e en n nt t t t t th h ha a an n n t t th h he e e s s so o oc c ci i ia a al l l o o on n ne e e. . . 
Paid-Extension in Nicaragua
Agriculture is an important sector in Nicaragua, contributing nearly 25% of the GDP and employing about 33% of the labor force (Banco Central de Nicaragua, 1997). (1997) for the private extension service in the Netherlands, suggest a range of extension provision cost per farmer between $US1360 and $US1590 for the period 1993 and 1996 (exchange rate of 1.7Dfl per $US1 was used). During this period, proceeds from producers range from 26% to 63% of the operating cost of the service. Although the cost of $423 in Nicaragua is lower than that in the Netherlands, it still should be viewed in the right perspective. The $423 value is the total budgeted cost, including the overhead of the coordinating units of INTA in Managua. This value is obviously higher than the direct cost of extension provision by ATP1 or ATP2, as is calculated later in the paper. It is worth mentioning that the demand for the service during the second season surpassed INTA's plan by more than 15%, and that payment by producers was close to 80%, as is shown in the next sections of the paper.
As can be seen from Table 2 , the number of INTA's extensionists that are involved with ATP1 is increasing, from 24 in 1995 to 78 in 1996, and 93 in 1997. This number is projected to increase to its ceiling value of 120 in 1998 and thereafter. Consequently, the ATPb program is 1 11 1 1 being substantially modified in order to allow INTA to continue to provide some level of extension to those producers who are unable to pay for extension services. Table 3 presents recovery rates of producers' payments for extension. The exponential growth in the number of producers (and groups) that joined ATP1 is explained by the "over capacity" of extension agents in INTA's regional offices that could absorb growing number of producers. However, given the present capacity--both professional and managerial--of INTA, these trends will decrease over time if INTA does not increase its professional and managerial capacities. 
Note: N/A= Not available.
The Private Agricultural Technology Transfer Service (ATP2)
In order to continue the diversification of its services, in mid-December 1994 INTA invited a number of private firms to jointly assess the possibility of providing private technical assistance to 1 13 3 3 small and medium producers. The use of private firms to provide agricultural technology transfer services was enhanced by the need to: (a) use market incentives to provide better services; (b) minimize the risk of a larger public bureaucracy; and (c) reduce the costs to the public sector through a cost-sharing scheme by which the clients would participate in the financing of the service. During the first years of this program, most of the costs are expected to be covered by the government through a loan from the World Bank.
After several months of demand evaluation, the first contracts --between producers, the government, and private firms--were signed in August 1995. According to these tripartite contracts, the producers were expected to pay a sum covering about 20% of the cost in the first year, and their contribution is expected to increase to nearly 80% in about five years. At the time of writing, no producer was paying more than 50% of the service provision costs. An estimate of the average cost of public extension provision in Nicaragua (based on INTA budget for 1995), suggests a direct cost per producer of $115/year. This estimate appears to be quite high compared with actual data for ATP1 and ATP2, as can be seen from the analysis in this paper. Producers in five regions were organized in groups and by end-July 1996 some 5,700 producers were served by 46 technicians and 7 supervisors contracted by 5 firms (each firm is responsible to provide extension services in a given region).
In contrast to the ATP1 concept, the service in ATP2 covers a wide range of farm production and marketing aspects. The size of the groups varies between 10 and 20 people. Each technician serves between 8 and 10 groups and attends between 100 and 150 producers. Figure 4 provides the participation trends in ATP2 during the first two years of the program. Contrary to the trends in ATP1, it can be seen in the case of ATP2 that each private company reached its ceiling quite fast (1 to 2 seasons, and in one case in the first season). This result is directly related to the government assessment of each company's capacity, and its decision to allow the company to provide extension services to a given amount of producers. Given this regulatory rule, firms attempt to maximize their proceeds by approaching as many producers as possible, until they reach the ceiling imposed by the government.
In the first stage of the work, the company's technician together with the producers prepared diagnostics of the situation on the farm, identified existing problems, and provided alternate 1 14 4 4 solutions to upgrade production efficiency. Jointly with each producer, a production plan and a training program were designed. This service is coordinated by a very small unit within INTA.
The main tasks of the unit are to administrate the activity and to guide its implementation. Note: Two more companies (# 6 and 7) were contracted and joined ATP2 in 10/1996.
Although the ATP2 concept is based on the participation of producers in the cost of the service provision, the selection of producers whose performance levels are not satisfactory may create problems in the recuperation of producers participation payments. This was the case in the first season of ATP1's operation (Auguset 1995). As a result of non-careful selection of participant producers, their performance was not satisfactory, leading to objections about paying for the service on their part. In the following seasons, farmers were recruited more carefully, accounting for certain professional skills to allow better implementation of extension recommendations. By the end of 1996, 85 percent of the producers paid their fees, and by the end of 1997, 7 firms provided extension services to more than 13,000 producers through 102 private technicians and collected 81% of the producers fees (2 firms joined in 8/97). Table 4 presents cost recovery rates by producers for the 7 private companies for the first and second years of ATP2's operation. In light 1 15 5 5 of the increasing number of producers--that creates logistical problems of fee collection, the costrecovery values of 81% on average (with a range between 64%-96%) are quite impressive. The drought conditions that affected coffee production, a major crop in certain regions, accounted for relatively low recovery rates for companies 2 and 5.
As correctly indicated by one reviewer, there is a potential problem of bias in the analysis if producers are selected for participating in paid-extension programs. In such case the impact of paid extension does not reflect real world distribution of producer ability and real willingness to pay. However, for an undertaking such as paid-extension departing from a heavily subsidized public extension, a selection approach such that was chosen in Nicaragua is fully justified. Source: Estrada-Rizo and Garcia (1997) for the period 8/95-7/96, and Estrada-Rizo (1997) for the period 9/96-10/97.
The Basic Public Extension Service (ATPb)
Although not directly the focus of this paper, ATPb is an extension program that will play an important role in the political agricultural arena. Bearing in mind that of the total population of more than 200,000 agricultural producers, only 40,000 are approached by the three ATP programs, and only 25,000-30,000 will be contacted through ATP1 and ATP2 by 1999. In order to reach the big producer population that is not approached through ATP1 and ATP2, policy makers will need to enhance, and diversify the coverage of ATPb.
Data on ATPb in Nicaragua became available from a study by ESECA (1997) based on 270 representative sample farms. Some of the information in that study can be used in conjunction with the performance indicators suggested in the previous section. Figure 5 shows participation trends of producers in ATPb between 1993 and 1996. 
Measuring Paid-Extension Costs and Performances in Nicaragua
In this section we will apply the analytical procedures that were presented earlier. First we will use some of the findings of ESECA (1997) to derive several performance measures. Without distinction between extension programs (see footnote) in the sample of the study by ESECA (1997), most producers (94%) applied the recommendations provided by extensionists. Of those applying the recommendations, 19% reported a 100% effectiveness, 61% reported 50 to 75% effectiveness, and 20% reported 25% effectiveness. Two more measurements of value of extension are the evaluation of INTA's technical assistance (ATPb+ATP1) and the change in producers' income as a result of that advice. Of the sampled producers, 43% and 50% ranked the service as "very 1 17 7 7 helpful" and "helpful", respectively. Forty one percent of the sampled producers reported an increase in their income, 47% reported stable income, and 12% reported a decline in income. These indicators, although not comprehensive in nature, provide some insight on the impact of INTA's technical assistance.
Although at this stage it is still impossible to distinguish between ATPb and ATP1 producers in the ESECA (1997a) sample, some interesting hypotheses can be stated. Table 5 shows that of the sampled producers, 25% were contacted once a week, 50% were contacted every fifteen days, and the rest (25%) were contacted between every three weeks and every three months. 1 1 1 0 0 0 Under conditions in Nicaragua, producer contacts was dependent on the level of accessibility to the producers, especially after heavy reainstorms that wash away roads. Thirty two percent and 27% of the producers were not accessible all year round by car and by motorcycle, respectively. Source: ESECA, 1997a
Measuring the Performance of ATP1
We will apply several measurements that utilize available data in order to demonstrate various aspects of ATP1's performances and impact. We start with applying a simple farm-level analysis to data available in the Primera 1996 season in order to estimate the gross incremental benefits associated with ATP1 technical assistance. Although this measurement can be the result of many 1 1 1 0 0 0 An interesting question is what characterizes the producers that are more frequently contacted. Additional finding is that 26% of the sampled producers paid for their extension services and 74% got it for free. Forms of delivery of recommendations are also split at the same rate. 29% received written recommendations, 68% received verbal recommendations, and 3% received recommendations in other forms. A hypothesis for verification is that those producers paying for the service were also visited once a week, and given written recommendations. Producers paying for the extension belong probably to the ATP1 program. If this is true, then it would be easy to compare between the performance of the extension agents and the producers in the cofinanced program and in the traditional public extension program.
other factors, it is an indicator that ATP1 has had a positive impact on producers' incremental incomes.
Obviously the highly positive result in B3 and the highly negative result in A2 dominate everything else in Table 6 . As a result, the "average" incremental gross margin of Cd 74,344 is not as robust as it could be. Our main objective in using these one-season-specific performances is to demonstrate the use of one particular indicator in evaluating paid-extension activities. Source: Computed from Garcia, 1996 a Not including region C6 for lack of data.
One indirect measure of the performance of extension is the rate of stability of the producer groups in the program. It is expected that a higher rate of instability (measured by the share of farmers/groups discontinuing their participation) is a reflection of a lower rate of satisfaction and a lower rate of extension performance. However, many random events such as unfavorable weather conditions may also contribute to low performances. Table 7 presents data which compares the results between 1995 and 1996.
Although all the numbers in the right column of Table 7 suggest a low rate of stability of the groups participating in ATP1, this can be explained by the relatively early stage of the program (second year), and by the inappropriate procedure for selecting the farmers in the various groups. However, the high level of farmer and group substitution in ATP1 is associated with the high transaction costs of establishing new groups and re-assigning of new farmers to existing groups. These transaction costs are to be borne by the extensionists who assemble the groups.
These factors should be taken into account when analyzing ATP1's performance. Source: Garcia (1996) Recent data for seven ATP1 extension-providing companies allows a three-year perspective on the stability of producer-participation (INTA, 1998) . Of the total 15,587 producers contracted for 1997/98, 26% are three year veterans, 39% are two years veterans, and 35% are new participants in the program. These figures indicate a better long-term stability of producer participation. Indeed, such analysis should be done, using long-term and aggregated data in order to provide sensible results.
In calculating the cost of extension provision in ATP1, we use actual data available for technical assistance programs in INTA (Estrada-Rizo and Garcia, 1997). These estimates are presented in Table 8 .
It appears from Table 8 that the annual average cost per extensionist in the technical assistance programs (ATPb and ATP1) is $3612. Figure 6 suggests that about 70% of these costs are for salary, 20% are for transportation, 5% are spent on producer training activities, and the rest (5%), are for administration, utility and other miscellaneous costs. Source: Estrada-Rizo and Garcia (1997) In order to calculate the cost of providing extension in the ATP1 program, and also to derive the cost of providing extension to an individual producer in ATP1, we can use estimates made by Estrada-Rizo and Garcia (1997) . Table 9 presents these estimates, and Figure 7 derives the cost per extensionist that is associated with ATP1 activities. 2 21 1 1 Source: Estrada-Rizo and Garcia (1997) Based on the data presented so far, it is possible to estimate the cost of providing ATP1 extension services to producers. In 1995-1997 the number of producers per group was approximately 11. Therefore, the cost per producer, as a function of the number of groups per extensionist varies between $66, in the case of 1 group per extensionist, and $30, in the case of 10 groups per extensionist.
Measuring the Performance of ATP2
In the case of ATP2, there are several private companies that provide extension services to producers that are contracted individually, but are also arranged in groups, such as in the case of the ATP1 program. In November 1997, there were seven private companies providing extension services, but data on financial reports of the companies are not available for 1997. In May of 1996, there were five private extension companies operating in Nicaragua. Figure 8 provides their market share in the producer population. Source: Based on financial statements submitted to the coordinating unit in ATP2.
In 1997, with the addition of two more companies, the market shares for the seven extension-providing companies were 13.7, 17.2, 13.4, 13.5, 12.7, 16.7, and 12.8 percent for companies 1, 2,7, 6, 3, 4, 5, respectively (INTA 1998) . In 1997 as in 1996, the market share of the private extension-providing companies remains more or less equal.
We were able to calculate the cost of ATP2 extension provision from the financial reports of the 5 private companies for the period 8/95-8/96. The share of the major cost components in the extension provision cost are presented in Figure 9 . As can be seen from Figure 9 , salary is the main component in the cost of extension provision, varying greatly among the companies. Transportation cost is also a relatively important cost component that varies among the companies, mainly because of location issues. On the average, 72% of the costs was spent on salaries, 10% on transportation, 3% on producer training activities, and the rest (15%), was spent on administration, utility and miscellaneous costs.
Comparison of the cost share between ATP1 and ATP2 provides some interesting results.
Salary cost and expenditures on producer training are strikingly similar, around 70% and 5%, respectively. Transportation cost share in ATP1 is doubled compared with ATP2 (20% and 10% respectively), and administration cost are tripled in ATP2 compared with ATP1 (15% and 5%, respectively). These two differences can be explained on the ground that (1) private companies in ATP2, unlike public agencies in ATP1, have more flexibility in selecting their clientele, also based on location, so their transportation costs are minimized, and (2) the administration costs in private companies include rent to their managers, which may increase this component in the budget, relative to ATP1.
The financial performance of the five ATP2 companies is presented in Table 10 . The calculated average gross margin is nearly 25%, which indicates a sustainable level of profit. However, one company has a very low level of performance (8%) that is mainly explained by a low level of producer fee collection.
Based on the data in Table 10 and Table 12 , the per producer cost of extension provision by ATP2 varies between $53 and $77 per year. This range is not too far apart from the estimated cost (between $30 and $66) of extension provision by ATP1, that was calculated earlier.
Another aspect of the financial status of the private companies that provide extension services to producers under the ATP2 program can be found in Tables 11 and 12 below.
Comparison of the private firms data in Table 11 suggest major differences in resource allocation for visits of farmers. While firm 1 allocates 24 working days per month for each extensionist, of which 83% (≅20 days) are spent on producers' visits, firm 5 allocates 22 working days per month for each extensionist, of which 77% (≅17 days) are spent on visits. Other interesting results are the big variation between the firms in both technician training and office work. If data on producer performance is available at the extension provider level, It could be used to estimate more accurate efficiency differences among the firms. Another trend worth-mentioning is the producer payment schedule. First-year participating producers pay 20% of the extension cost; second-year participating producers pay 30% of the cost, and so far, third year participating producers pay 50% of the cost. This schedule is expected to reach 100% cost recovery in five to eight years. Finally, the total cost of the extension provision in 1997/98 will be borne as follows: producers 31.7%, the government of Nicaragua 18.5%, and a World Bank loan 49.8%. So far the data available also allows a comparison some indicators between ATP1 and ATP2. For example, it seems that the work load on ATP1 and ATP2 extensionists is similar.
While in 1995-1997 ATP1 extensionists were responsible also for ATPb activities (and therefore, impossible to compare their workload), it is envisioned that in 1999 they will only be engaged with ATP1 programs. Therefore, the projected indicators of ATP1 for 1999 (groups per exte nsionist, and producers per extensionist) in Table 2 while compared to that in Table 13 for ATP2 suggests a similar work load measured in the number of producers per group, and number of groups per extensionist.
With all the available data at hand, it is possible to calculate meaningful benefit-cost ind icators, as was suggested in the analytical framework section. We present such analysis for one ATP2 company (#4) in Table 13 . As can be seen from the table, the private cost benefit ratio is higher than the social one, not taking into account the government subsidy to the companies. The indicators also do not include opportunity cost associated with terminating the existing ATPb program. Once the costs of the enhanced ATPb program considered by the government are available, it would be possible to calculate a revised benefit cost ratio.
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3. the social cost of non-or alternative extension methods to substitute public extension for the poor and subsistent producers.
4. the long-term sustainability of paid extension in developing countries needs to be re-examined once external funding for paid-extension projects are gone, and to check the effectiveness of mechanisms to ensure their self sustainability.
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